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Indistinguishability Obfuscation and UCEs:
The Case of Computationally Unpredictable Sources
Christina Brzuska1 Pooya Farshim2 Arno Mittelbach2
1Tel Aviv University, Israel
2Darmstadt University of Technology, Germany
Abstract. Random oracles are powerful cryptographic objects. They facilitate the security proofs
of an impressive number of practical cryptosystems ranging from KDM-secure and deterministic
encryption to point-function obfuscation and many more. However, due to an uninstantiability result
of Canetti, Goldreich, and Halevi (STOC 1998) random oracles have become somewhat controversial.
Recently, Bellare, Hoang, and Keelveedhi (BHK; CRYPTO 2013 and ePrint 2013/424, August 2013)
introduced a new abstraction called Universal Computational Extractors (UCEs), and showed that
they suffice to securely replace random oracles in a number of prominent applications, including all
those mentioned above, without suffering from the aforementioned uninstantiability result. This,
however, leaves open the question of constructing UCEs in the standard model.
We show that the existence of indistinguishability obfuscation (iO) implies (non-black-box) attacks
on all the definitions that BHK proposed within their UCE framework in the original version of
their paper, in the sense that no concrete hash function can satisfy them. We also show that this
limitation can be overcome, to some extent, by restraining the class of admissible adversaries via a
statistical notion of unpredictability. Following our attack, BHK (ePrint 2013/424, September 2013),
independently adopted this approach in their work.
In the updated version of their paper, BHK (ePrint 2013/424, September 2013) also introduce two
other novel source classes, called bounded parallel sources and split sources, which aim at recovering
the computational applications of UCEs that fall outside the statistical fix. These notions keep to
a computational notion of unpredictability, but impose structural restrictions on the adversary so
that our original iO attack no longer applies. We extend our attack to show that indistinguishability
obfuscation is sufficient to also break the UCE security of any hash function against bounded parallel
sources. Towards this goal, we use the randomized encodings paradigm of Applebaum, Ishai, and
Kushilevitz (STOC 2004) to parallelize the obfuscated circuit used in our attack, so that it can be
computed by a bounded parallel source whose second stage consists of constant-depth circuits. We
conclude by discussing the composability and feasibility of hash functions secure against split sources.
Keywords. Randomized encodings, Obfuscation, UCE, Random oracle
1 Introduction
Since their formal introduction in the seminal paper of Bellare and Rogaway [BR93], random oracles
have found extensive use across a wide spectrum of cryptographic protocols. Their versatility has lead
researchers to seek for a unified formalization of their useful properties, hoping that such a definition
could be eventually realized. Canetti, Goldreich, and Halevi [CGH98] proposed such a definition, but
somewhat disappointingly, also proved a negative result which ruled out instantiations of random oracles
in arbitrary (perhaps artificial) cryptographic protocols by any keyed hash functions. This negative
result was subsequently extended in a number of works [Nie02, GK03, DOP05, KP09, BBP04, CGH04].
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Figure 1: Schematic of the UCE game. Source S
has access to Hash, which returns real or ideal hash
values, and leaks L to a distinguisher D. The latter
additionally gets the hash key and outputs a bit b′.
Main UCES,DH (λ)
b←$ {0, 1}; hk←$ H.Kg(1λ)
L←$ SHash(1λ)
b′ ←$ D(1λ, hk, L)
return (b = b′)
Hash(x)
if T [x] = ⊥ then
if b = 1 then
T [x] ← H.Ev(1λ, hk, x)
else T [x]←$ {0, 1}H.ol(λ)
return T [x]
Figure 2: Pseudocode for the UCE game. Here H.ol(λ) is a
function which specifies the length of hash values.
UCE security. Bellare, Hoang, and Keelvedhi (BHK) [BHK13a, BHK13b, BHK13c]1 revisited the
above question and formulated an attractive new security notion called Universal Computational Ex-
tractor (UCE). They were able to apply their framework to an interesting and diverse set of security
goals, which included among other things, security under key-dependent attacks, security under related-
key attacks, simultaneous hardcore bits, point-function obfuscation, garbling schemes, proofs of storage,
and deterministic encryption. Recently, Matsuda and Hanaoka [MH14] were able to use UCEs to also
build CCA-secure public-key encryption schemes.
The UCE framework comes in two versions: a single-key version (UCE) and a multi-key version
(mUCE). For a keyed hash function H, single-key UCE security is defined via a two-stage security game
consisting of algorithms S and D, called the source and the distinguisher, respectively. In the first
stage, the source is given access to an oracle Hash that, depending on a challenge bit b, implements
either a random oracle or the concrete hash function with a randomly chosen key hk. The source
terminates with some leakage L, which is then communicated together with hk to the distinguisher D.
The distinguisher’s goal is to guess the bit b, i.e., guess whether the source interacted with the random
oracle or the hash function. The UCE advantage of the pair (S,D) is defined as the probability of
returning the correct answer scaled away from one-half. (The stronger multi-key version is defined
analogously by introducing Hash oracles for multiple keys and providing the keys together with leakage
to the distinguisher.) We summarize this interaction schematically in Figure 1, and give the pseudocode
in Figure 2. We refer the reader to the original work for an excellent philosophical perspective on this
framework.
Without any restrictions UCE security cannot be achieved: the source can simply leak one of its
oracle queries together with the corresponding answer to the distinguisher, which then can locally
compute the hash value on the queried point (the distinguisher knows the hash key) and compare it to
the leaked hash value. Thus, the source needs to be somehow restricted, and this restriction forms the
actual UCE definition: for a source class S we denote the UCE assumption with sources restricted to S
by UCE[S]. Prior to our work, BHK proposed two source classes via unpredictability and reset security
conditions, which in turn gave rise to two notions called UCE1 and UCE2, respectively.
The UCE1 notion [BHK13a, BHK13b] is defined using an unpredictability game which requires that
when the source is run with a random oracle, its leakage does not computationally reveal any of its
queries. This is formalized by requiring that the probability of any efficient predictor P in guessing
a query of S when given L is negligible. Such a source is then called unpredictable, and leads to
the following definition of UCE1 security: a hash function is UCE1 secure if the advantage of all
efficient, unpredictable sources S, and all efficient distinguishers D in the UCE game is negligible. The
stronger notion of UCE2 security is defined analogously by requiring that the source satisfies the weaker
requirement of reset security.
1 Citation [BHK13a] refers to the CRYPTO 2013 proceedings version, [BHK13b] refers to its full version on Cryptology
ePrint Archive from August 2013 prior to communicating our basic iO attack (presented in this paper), and [BHK13c]
refers to the updated version from September/October 2013.
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Following our attack (that we describe next and that we communicated to BHK in August 2013
[BHK13d]), the UCE1 and UCE2 notions were revised in [BHK13c] and additional restrictions on sources
were imposed. We will be discussing these shortly, after presenting our first attack.
An attack on UCE1 (and UCE2). Our first attack, described in Section 3, targets the original
UCE notions UCE1 and UCE2, and is based on a recent breakthrough in the construction of obfus-
cation schemes. Garg et al. [GGH+13] give a candidate construction for the so-called notion of indis-
tinguishability obfuscation [BGI+01] based on intractability assumptions related to multi-linear maps.
Our attack shows that any UCE1 construction would need to falsify one of these assumptions. Put
differently, if indistinguishability obfuscation exists, then UCE1 security (and hence also the stronger
UCE2 security) cannot be achieved.
Roughly speaking, a secure indistinguishability obfuscation (iO) scheme assures that the obfuscations
of any two circuits that implement the same function are computationally indistinguishable. Our attack
uses this primitive as follows. The source picks a random point x, and queries it to Hash to get y. It
then prepares an iO of the Boolean circuit (H(·, x) = y), and leaks it to the distinguisher as L. The
distinguisher now plugs the hash key hk into this obfuscated circuit and returns whatever the circuit
outputs. It is easy to see that the distinguisher recovers the challenge bit correctly with an overwhelming
probability. What is less clear, however, is whether or not the source is unpredictable. Recall that the
unpredictability game operates with respect to a random oracle. Let us now assume, for simplicity, that
|hk| < |y|/2 (we will not need to rely on this assumption in our full attack). For any x, there are at
most 2|hk| possible values for H(hk, x), and a random y would be one of them with probability at most
2|hk|/2|y| < 2−|y|/2, which is negligible. Consequently, the obfuscated circuit implements the constant
zero function with overwhelming probability. This allows us to apply the security of the obfuscator
to conclude the attack: the obfuscated circuit does not leak any more information about x than the
zero function would, and since x was chosen randomly, it remains hidden from the view of any efficient
predicator.
Salvaging UCE. Assuming the existence of indistinguishability obfuscation, we ask to what extent
UCE can be salvaged. That is, do there exist other UCE assumptions that allow recovering (some of)
the originally presented applications? We partially salvage UCEs by modifying the unpredictability
condition and letting the predictor run in unbounded time. This statistical notion of unpredictability
restricts the class of admissible sources such that the source implementing the iO attack falls outside it:
an unbounded predictor can reverse engineer the computationally secure obfuscator. This modification
is validated by the work of Goldwasser and Rothblum [GR07] who show that a statistical analogue of iO
is impossible unless the polynomial hierarchy collapses to its second level. As we discuss in Section 3.2, a
large number of interesting applications (such as KDM and RKA security) survives under this definition.
After communicating our attack, BHK independently suggested the statistical patch [BHK13c].
In the revised version of their paper [BHK13c], they recast their proofs of security to rely only on
statistical unpredictability for all applications where this is possible. We refer to [BHK13c] for details
on the applications that can be salvaged by statistical UCE1. As mentioned earlier, not all applications
can be salvaged by statistical unpredictability. Hence, BHK also present two additional UCE notions
based on computational unpredictability, which together with the statistical patch allowed them to fully
recover their original set of applications in light of the aforementioned iO attack. We discuss these next.
Computational UCE. Some applications discussed in [BHK13a, BHK13b], specifically hardcore
functions, deterministic public-key encryption (D-PKE), message-locked encryption (MLE), and OAEP
rely on computational unpredictability in an intrinsic way; that is, the reduction only works if the pre-
dictor is bound to run in polynomial time. For instance, the source presented in [BHK13a, BHK13b]
for D-PKEs produces leakage which contains encryptions of messages that have been sent to the Hash
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oracle. An unbounded predictor can easily decipher the ciphertexts and predict Hash queries of the
source.
Following the above attack, in the updated version of their paper, BHK [BHK13c] propose two novel
UCE notions by imposing additional restrictions on the way the source operates, while keeping the orig-
inal computational unpredictability game. The goal here is that these restrictions are sufficiently strong
to circumvent our attack, but weak enough so that successful security reductions can be established.
To recover D-PKEs, MLEs, and OAEP, BHK propose a new UCE assumption based on compu-
tational unpredictability restricted to so-called bounded parallel sources. Such a source splits into two
stages S0 and S1. In the first phase, algorithm S0 prepares a vector of strings. In the second phase,
independent instances of S1 for each entry in the previously prepared vector are run in parallel. Each
instance gets access to the Hash oracle and their combined outputs make up the final leakage. To
circumvent our attack two restrictions on S1 are imposed: its runtime and number of Hash queries (per
instance). The idea here is that computing the obfuscation of a hash function is “too costly,” and hence
the attack cannot be mounted.
In Section 4 we show that this refined notion still falls prey to a similar, but somewhat more complex
attack. The idea is to split the iO attack into two stages consisting of a high-complexity first stage
and a parallelizable second stage. To this end, we use the powerful randomized encodings paradigm of
Applebaum, Ishai, and Kushilevitz [AIK04] to bring down the complexity of the second stage of the
attack. The randomized encoding fˆ(x; r) of f(x) is simply an encoding of f(x) such that a decoder
dec can retrieve the original value f(x) from it, i.e., dec(fˆ(x; r)) = f(x). In addition, a randomized
encoding specifies an efficient simulator Sim such that for all x the distributions fˆ(x; r) over uniformly
chosen r and Sim(f(x)) are computationally indistinguishable. These properties combined allow us to
show that we can adapt our original attack such that the source does not leak the obfuscated circuit
but rather a randomized encoding of it. This alone, however, is still not enough for an attack with the
restrictions of bounded parallel sources. Finally, we utilize a special form of decomposable randomized
encodings [IKOS08] to realize an attack. Such encodings have the property that each output bit of fˆ(x; r)
depends on at most a single bit of x (but possibly on the entire string r). The randomized encoding of
Applebaum, Ishai, and Kushilevitz [AIK06] is decomposable and supports all functions in P/poly. We
show how to use such an encoding scheme to split the computation of the encoding into two phases: a
complex first preprocessing phase which does not depend on the actual input and a very simple second
stage which can be parallelized and where each parallel instance essentially only has to drop one of two
bits. We show that this second stage (which will correspond to S1) can be implemented by constant-
depth circuits consisting only of very few gates. This application of decomposable randomized encodings
could be of interest also in other scenarios where efficiently computing an encoding is important and
preprocessing is possible.
While bounded parallel sources are sufficient to also recover simultaneous hardcore functions, BHK
propose a second, simpler UCE assumption based on split sources. A split source consists of two parts
S0 and S1, in which each part independently contributes to the leakage sent to the distinguisher. The
idea is that none of these sub-sources gets direct access to the Hash oracle. Rather, algorithm S0 defines
the queries (without access to any hash values) and algorithm S1 gets to see the hash values but not the
queries. As for our attack, note that the associated source needs to know both the query x and its hash
value y ← Hash(x) in order to compute the circuit (H(·, x) = y). In Section 5, we discuss split sources
in a larger context and present necessary conditions for a hash function to achieve split-source UCE
security. For example, we show that in order to prove the security of a hash function H, one needs to
show that the function that maps x to the obfuscation of the circuit H(·, x) must not be one way. We also
discuss intricacies regarding composition of such functions with one-way permutations, and show that
such a composition does not harm standard notions such as collision resistance, pseudorandomness (and
indeed statistical UCE1 security) but provably fails for split-source security. We present this discussion
in Section 5.
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Main UCES,DH (λ)
b←$ {0, 1}; hk←$ H.Kg(λ)
L←$ SHash(1λ)
b′ ←$ D(1λ, hk, L)
return (b = b′)
Hash(x)
if T [x] = ⊥ then
if b = 1 then T [x] ← H.Ev(1λ, hk, x)
else T [x]←$ {0, 1}H.ol(λ)
return T [x]
Main PredPS (λ)
done ← false; Q← ∅
L←$ SHash(1λ); done ← true
Q′ ←$ PHash(1λ, L)
return (Q ∩Q′ 6= ∅)
Hash(x)
if done = false then Q← Q ∪ {x}
if T [x] = ⊥ then
T [x]←$ {0, 1}H.ol(λ)
return T [x]
Main ResetRS (λ)
Dom ← ∅; L←$ SHash(1λ); b←$ {0, 1}
if b = 0 then
for (x, ℓ) ∈ Dom do
T [x]←$ {0, 1}H.ol(λ)
b′ ←$ RHash(1λ, L); return (b′ = b)
Hash(x)
Dom ← Dom ∪ {x}
if T [x] = ⊥ then T [x]←$ {0, 1}H.ol(λ)
return T [x]
Figure 3: The UCE security game together with the unpredictability and reset-security games.
To conclude, although UCEs strengthen our confidence in the security of many practical schemes
in the random-oracle model, our attacks highlight the need for a thorough assessment of definitional
choices that can be made within the UCE framework. This assessment, in addition to instantiability
questions, should also include studying concrete instantiations of UCEs such as the SHA family [Nat12]
in HMAC mode, as suggested by BHK [BHK13a].
2 Preliminaries
Notation. We denote by λ ∈ N the security parameter, which is implicitly given to all algorithms (if
not explicitly stated so) in the unary representation 1λ. By {0, 1}ℓ we denote the set of all bit-strings
of length ℓ, and by {0, 1}∗ the set of all bit-strings of finite length. For two strings x1, x2 ∈ {0, 1}
∗ their
concatenation is written as x1‖x2. The length of x is denoted by |x| and x[i] is the i-th bit of x. For a
finite set X, we denote the action of sampling x uniformly at random from X by x←$ X, and denote
the cardinality of X by |X|. Algorithms are assumed to be randomized, unless otherwise stated. We call
an algorithm efficient or PPT if it runs in time polynomial in the security parameter. By y ← A(x; r)
we denote that y was output by algorithm A on input x and randomness r. If A is randomized and
no randomness is specified, then we assume that A is run with freshly sampled uniform random coins,
and write this is as y←$ A(x). We often refer to algorithms, or tuples of algorithms, as adversaries.
We say a function negl(λ) is negligible if |negl(λ)| ∈ λ−|ω(1)|. In this paper we deploy the game-playing
framework of Bellare and Rogaway [BR06] with the augmented game procedures described in [RSS11].
Syntax of hash functions. In line with [BHK13a], we consider the following formalization of hash
functions. A function family H is a five tuple of PPT algorithms (H.Kg,H.Ev,H.kl,H.il,H.ol) as follows.
The algorithms H.kl, H.il, and H.ol are deterministic and on input 1λ define the key length, input length,
and output lengths, respectively. (We have adopted the simplified notion from [BHK13a] here.) The key
generation algorithm H.Kg gets the security parameter 1λ as input and outputs a key hk ∈ {0, 1}H.kl(λ).
The deterministic evaluation algorithm H.Ev takes as input the security parameter 1λ, a key hk, a
message x ∈ {0, 1}H.il(λ) and generates a hash value H.Ev(1λ, hk, x) ∈ {0, 1}H.ol(λ).
UCE game. Let H = (H.Kg,H.Ev,H.kl,H.il,H.ol) be a hash function and (S,D) be a pair of PPT
algorithms. We define the UCE advantage of (S,D) against H through
AdvuceH,S,D(λ) := 2 · Pr
[
UCES,DH (λ)
]
− 1 ,
where game UCES,DH (λ) is shown in Figure 3 on the left.
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Unpredictability. A source S is called computationally unpredictable if the advantage of any PPT
predictor P defined by
Adv
pred
S,P (λ) := Pr
[
PredPS (λ)
]
is negligible, where game PredPS (λ) is shown in Figure 3 in the middle. We denote the class of all
computationally unpredictable sources by Scup.
UCE security. We say a hash function H is UCE1 secure if for all computationally unpredictable
PPT sources S and all PPT distinguishers D the advantage AdvuceH,S,D(λ) is negligible. In the later version
of their paper [BHK13c], BHK refer to UCE1 as UCE[Scup]. BHK introduce a stronger version called
UCE2 which is based on the reset-security game ResetRS (1
λ) shown in Figure 3 on the right. We refer
the reader to [BHK13b] for the details, but note here that UCE2 security implies UCE1 security and,
thus, any attack on UCE1 also applies to UCE2.
We discuss the revised UCE assumptions introduced in [BHK13c], namely those for bounded parallel
sources and split sources, in Sections 4 and 5, respectively.
Indistinguishability obfuscation. Roughly speaking, an indistinguishability obfuscation (iO) scheme
ensures that the obfuscations of any two functionally equivalent circuits are computationally indistin-
guishable. Indistinguishability obfuscation was originally proposed by Barak et al. [BGI+01] as a po-
tential weakening of virtual-black-box obfuscation. We recall the definition from [GGH+13]. A PPT
algorithm iO is called an indistinguishability obfuscator for a circuit class {Cλ}λ∈N if the following con-
ditions are satisfied:
• Correctness. For all security parameters λ ∈ N, for all C ∈ Cλ, and for all inputs x we have
that
Pr
[
C ′(x) = C(x) : C ′←$ iO(1λ, C)
]
= 1 .
• Security. For any PPT distinguisher D, for all pairs of circuits C0, C1 ∈ Cλ such that C0(x) =
C1(x) on all inputs x the following distinguishing advantage is negligible:
AdvioiO,D,C0,C1(λ) := Pr
[
D(iO(1λ, C1)) = 1
]
− Pr
[
D(iO(1λ, C0)) = 1
]
.
With their recent candidate construction for indistinguishability obfuscation, Garg et al. [GGH+13]
have revived interest in the study of obfuscation schemes (see, for example, [SW13, BR13, HSW14,
BR14a, BR14b, GGHR14, BGK+14, BCP14] and the references therein). Garg et al. prove that under
an intractability assumption related to multi-linear maps their construction yields an indistinguisha-
bility obfuscator for all circuits in NC1. Additionally, assuming a perfectly correct fully homomorphic
encryption scheme and a perfectly sound non-interactive witness-indistinguishable proof system, they
also show how their obfuscation scheme can be bootstrapped to support any polynomial-size circuit.
In a recent work, Barak et al. [BGK+14] have further simplified the construction and showed that it is
secure against all generic multi-linear attacks.
3 UCE1 and UCE2 Security
In this section we formalize our iO attack on the UCE1 (and hence the stronger UCE2) security of any
concrete hash function. We also propose a fix to these notions which avoids the attack while still being
applicable to a number of cryptosystems.
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3.1 The iO attack
Our attack uses an indistinguishability obfuscation scheme in a black-box way, but is non-black-box as
it relies on the code of the hash function for obfuscation. (Therefore, the attack does not contradict
the positive feasibility of BHK in the random-oracle model.) We stress that the complexity of running
our attack, although high, is polynomial, and will benefit from future advances in the construction of
iO schemes.
Theorem 3.1 (UCE1 infeasibility). If indistinguishability obfuscation exists, then UCE1 security cannot
be achieved in the standard model.
Proof. Let H be a UCE1-secure hash function family. Let us assume for now that H.ol(λ) ≥ 2 ·H.kl(λ),
that is, the output length of the hash function is at least twice the size of a hash key. (We will be
dropping this condition shortly.) Define a source S which generates a random value x←$ {0, 1}H.il(λ)
and computes y ← Hash(x). It then constructs the Boolean circuit
Cλ,H,x,y(·) := (H.Ev(1
λ, ·, x) = y) .
The source S passes on an encoding of circuit Cλ,H,x,y(·) as leakage L to the distinguisher. We will
later use obfuscation to ensure that x is not leaked by the encoding of Cλ,H,x,y(·) (this is needed for
unpredictability). The distinguisher D recovers circuit Cλ,H,x,y(·) from the leakage L, and computes
b′ ← Cλ,H,x,y(hk) using the given hash key hk, and returns b
′. The UCE1 adversary (S,D) has advantage
1− 2−H.ol(λ): When the source is run with oracle access to H.Ev(1λ, hk, ·), the circuit always returns 1.
When S interacts with a random oracle, y coincides with H.Ev(1λ, hk, x) with probability 2−H.ol(λ).
Now let iO be an indistinguishability obfuscator. Instead of leaking circuit Cλ,H,x,y(·), we let S
compute an obfuscation of the circuit and output L←$ iO(Cλ,H,x,y(·)). By the correctness property of
the obfuscator, distinguisher D, as before, has an overwhelming advantage in guessing the challenge bit
correctly. It remains to show that the adapted source S is unpredictable.
Unpredictability. Let P be a predictor in the PredPS (λ) game. We bound the success probability
of P based on the security of the indistinguishability obfuscator iO via a sequence of three games as
follows.
Game0(λ): is identical to the computational unpredictability game Pred
P
S (λ) (see Figure 3).
Game1(λ): is similar to the previous game except that the game terminates if there exists an hk ∈
{0, 1}H.kl(λ) such that Cλ,H,x,y(hk) = 1. We write (x, y) ∈ Bad(λ) if for values (x, y) such an hk
exists for which Cλ,H,x,y(hk) = 1.
Game2(λ): is similar to the previous game except that S now leaks iO(Zλ(·)), where Zλ(·) denotes the
constant zero circuit.
By the fundamental lemma of the game-playing technique [BR06] we have that
Pr
[
GameP0 (λ)
]
− Pr
[
GameP1 (λ)
]
≤ Prx,y [ (x, y) ∈ Bad(λ)] ≤
1
2H.ol(λ)/2
,
where the last inequality holds from the union bound and the fact that H.ol(λ) ≥ 2 · H.kl(λ). For this
note there are at most 2H.kl(λ) possible values for H.Ev(1λ, hk, x). A random y would be one of the image
values with probability at most 2H.kl(λ)2−H.ol(λ), which by assumption is at most 2−H.ol(λ)/2.
We bound the change in P ’s advantage from Game1(λ) to Game2(λ) based on the security of the
obfuscator. Let Gamei[x, y](λ) denote Gamei(λ) where the source S chooses x as its query and the
Hash oracle on the single query x chooses y as its response. We define D[x, y](C) to be a distinguisher
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against the indistinguishability obfuscator that gets as input a circuit C, which is either an obfuscation
of the zero circuit C0 := Zλ(·) or an obfuscation of circuit C1 := Cλ,H,x,y(·). Distinguisher D[x, y](C)
runs the predictor P on C to get x′, and returns (x = x′). Note that, according to the rules of the game
(due to event Bad) both C0 and C1 implement the same functionality (namely zero). If C = C1, then
distinguisher D[x, y] perfectly simulates Game1[x, y](λ) for P . In case D[x, y] gets as input C = C0, it
perfectly simulates Game2(λ) for P . Hence,
Pr
[
GameP1 (λ)
]
− Pr
[
GameP2 (λ)
]
=E(x,y)/∈Bad(λ)
[
Pr
[
GameP1 [x, y](λ)
]]
− E(x,y)/∈Bad(λ)
[
Pr
[
GameP2 [x, y](λ)
]]
=E(x,y)/∈Bad(λ)
[
Pr
[
GameP1 [x, y](λ)
]
− Pr
[
GameP2 [x, y](λ)
]]
=E(x,y)/∈Bad(λ)
[
AdvioiO,D[x,y],C0,C1(λ)
]
≤ max
(x,y)/∈Bad(λ)
AdvioiO,D[x,y],C0,C1(λ) .
By the security of the indistinguishability obfuscation we have that for any pair (x, y) (which is
not in Bad(λ) and hence circuit C1 = Cλ,H,x,y is the constant zero circuit) the advantage function
AdvioiO,D[x,y],C0,C1(λ) is negligible, and hence so is the function max(x,y)/∈Bad(λ) Adv
io
iO,D[x,y],C0,C1
(λ).
In game Game2(λ) the leakage contains no information on value x and hence the probability of
predictor P guessing x is upper bounded by Q(λ)/2H.il(λ), where Q(λ) denotes the number of oracle
queries of S, which is negligible. Putting the above sequence of inequalities together, we get that the
source is unpredictable.
Dropping the requirement. It remains to argue how we can drop the requirement on the size of
hash keys. For this note that we can simply choose a t such that t ≥ 2 · ⌈H.kl(λ)/H.ol(λ)⌉ and let the
source leak an obfuscation of the circuit (H.Ev(1λ, ·, x1) = y1 ∧ · · · ∧ H.Ev(1
λ, ·, xt) = yt).
In the above proof, we relied on the source being able to make multiple queries to its hash oracle.
Bellare, Hoang, and Keelveedhi [BHK13d] point out that the theorem can be extended to a single-
query source by applying a pseudorandom generator to the output of the hash function. This result is
noteworthy as several applications only require the source to make a single query.
3.2 Statistical unpredictability
The iO attack immediately gives rise to the following question: can the UCE1 and/or UCE2 notions
be somehow patched so that they avoid the attack while maintaining (part of) their wide applicability?
Fortunately, we show that this is indeed the case. We start by observing that the security guarantee of
the indistinguishability obfuscator is only computational. Consequently, the attack can be directly ruled
out by demanding the source to be statistically unpredictability, i.e., by letting a potential predictor run
in unbounded time (but still impose polynomial query complexity). More formally, we say a source S
is statistically unpredictable if the advantage of any (possibly unbounded) predictor P with polynomial
query complexity in the PredPS (λ) game shown in Figure 3 (middle) is negligible. Statistical UCE2
security can be defined analogously, where we let the reset distinguisher run in unbounded time and
only place a polynomial bound on the number of its queries.
The above definition, in turn, leads to the following two questions: (1) Is a statistically secure variant
of indistinguishability obfuscation possible? (2) Are there any application scenarios which only rely on
this weaker property? Goldwasser and Rothblum [GR07] provide a negative answer to the first question
by showing that the existence of a statistically secure iO scheme implies the collapse of the polynomial
hierarchy to its second level. This impossibility result reinforces our confidence in the soundness of the
above definition. For the second question, recall that the unpredictability game is always defined with
respect to a random oracle, and hence statistical unpredictability may be (non-trivially) achievable.
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Indeed, consider a source which samples a random point x, queries it to its oracle, and leaks the result
to the distinguisher. It is easy to see that this source is statistically unpredictable as a random oracle is
one-way against unbounded adversaries. Indeed, many of the cryptosystems considered by BHK admit
security proofs with sources that essentially take this simple form [BHK13a, BHK13b]. We present a
brief discussion of these, next.
KDM security of BRS: The unpredictability advantage of the source used in the KDM security of
the BRS scheme [BRS02] is upper bounded by the probability of guessing one of polynomially
many randomly chosen λ-bit strings. The probability of guessing each string is 2−λ, and hence
the unpredictability advantage is, information theoretically, negligible.
RKA security of BRS: The unpredictability advantage is upper bounded by the number of message
pairs queried to the challenge oracle times the maximum probability of guessing the output of
a related-key derivation (RKD) function (on a randomly chosen key). By the assumption on
the statistical output unpredictability of the allowed RKD functions, we get that the prediction
probability is negligible.
CIH security: The unpredictability advantage here is upper bounded by the number of hash queries
times the maximum probability of guessing the output of a correlated-input derivation (CID)
function on a randomly chosen input point. By assumption, the CID set is statistically output
unpredictable, and hence the unpredictability advantage is also negligible.
Point obfuscation: The unpredictability of the source used in the security of the hash-then-compare
point obfuscation scheme is upper bounded by the maximum probability of guessing the obfuscated
point α. Since α is assumed to have high min-entropy, we also recover this application.
Storage: Here we rely on the probability of guessing the stored data, which is assumed to be negligible.
The unpredictability advantage is upper bounded by a polynomial multiple of this probability.
Consequently the storage application also survives.
Garbling schemes: This application relies on statistically reset-secure sources. To salvage this ap-
plication, we note that reset security is information theoretically upper bounded by a polynomial
multiple of 2−λ.
After we communicated our attack [BHK13d], BHK in the revised version of their paper [BHK13c]
also independently suggested the statistical notion of unpredictability. They denote by Ssup the class of
all statistically unpredictable sources and recast their proofs of the above to use UCE[Ssup]. We refer
to [BHK13c] for details on the applications that can be salvaged with statistical UCE1 aka UCE[Ssup]
(resp. statistical UCE2 aka UCE[Ssrs]).
We end this section by noting that for the hardcore predicate, BR93 encryption, D-PKE, MLE and
OAEP application scenarios discussed in [BHK13a, BHK13b], the leakage contains auxiliary information
related to a query x that only computationally hides x (e.g., it might contain a one-way image f(x),
or an encryption of x). Consequently, an unbounded predictor might well be able to guess the point x,
and in these cases our statistical patch is no longer useful. Despite this, we observe that UCE-secure
hash functions with regard to statistical unpredictability are hardcore for highly non-injective one-way
functions. (The proof is essentially equivalent to that in [BHK13b] and relies on the fact that any (even
an unbounded) predictor cannot recover the exact query if the preimage space is super-polynomially
large.)
9
Prl Source SHash(1λ)
(L0,L
′)←$ S0(1
λ)
for i = 1, . . . ,
∣
∣L
′
∣
∣ do L[i]←$ SHash1 (1
λ
,L
′[i])
L← (L0,L)
return L
Splt Source SHash(1λ)
(L0,x)←$ S0(1
λ)
for i = 1, . . . , |x| do y[i]←$ Hash(x[i])
L1←$ S1(1
λ
,y);L← (L0, L1)
return L
Figure 4: The parallel source S = Prl[S0, S1] on the left and the split source S = Splt[S0, S1] on the right as defined in the
updated version of [BHK13c]. In both cases the source consists of two parts S0 and S1 that jointly generate leakage L. For
split sources neither part gets direct oracle access to Hash. For parallel sources additional restrictions on the runtime and
the number of queries of S1, and the length of leakage L0 are imposed. Note that the invocations of S1 are parallelizable
and independent of one another.
4 Bounded Parallel Sources
In the updated version of their paper [BHK13c], BHK introduce novel UCE-type security notions to
recover applications where statistical unpredictability is of no help. The main idea behind these new
UCE assumptions is that, in order to keep the unpredictability condition computational, the source
needs to operate in a restricted way so that the iO attack cannot be mounted any longer.
A new restricted source class that BHK introduce to recover the deterministic public-key encryption
(D-PKE), message-locked encryption (MLE), and OAEP applications is that of bounded parallel sources.
In parallel sources the source splits into two parts S0 and S1 as follows. The first part of the source S0
does not get oracle access to Hash, and simply outputs some preliminary leakage L0 and a vector L
′ of
arbitrary bit strings. For each entry in L′ an independent instance of the second part of the source S1
is run. This can be done in parallel as the several invocations do not share any coins or state. Instance
i of S1 is given L
′[i] as input which then produces leakage L[i]. As opposed to S0, the second part S1
of parallel sources has oracle access to Hash. The final leakage of the source S := Prl[S0, S1] is set to
be L := (L0,L). The details of a parallel source S = Prl[S0, S1] are given in Figure 4 on the left.
Without any further restrictions, parallel sources are as powerful as regular sources: simply ignore
S0 and let a single S1 generate the entire leakage. Thus, in order to circumvent the iO attack, further
restrictions are necessary. To this end, BHK restrict the resources of S0 and S1 via polynomials τ , σ,
and q as follows: (1) the running time (circuit size) of each invocation of S1 is at most τ(·); (2) each
invocation of S1 makes at most q(·) oracle queries; and (3) the length of initial leakage L0 output by
S0 is at most σ(·). BHK then consider the class S
prl
τ,σ,q consisting of all parallel sources satisfying these
bounds, and define UCE for computationally unpredictable, bounded parallel sources by considering
UCE[Scup ∩ Sprlτ,σ,q].
For their results on D-PKE and MLE schemes, the parameters τ , σ, and q need to be fine-tuned
according to the underlying encryption scheme. More precisely, BHK set q to 1 (each instance of S1
makes a single hash query), σ to the size of a key-pair (0 in the case of MLEs), and τ to the runtime of
the encryption operation plus the input and key sizes of the encryption scheme. It is easily seen that
our basic attack does not fall into this class as long as the computation of the obfuscated circuit takes
longer than what is granted by τ .
We start by observing that BHK’s bound on the initial leakage L0 output by the first part of the
source S0 seems to be unnecessary. Indeed, there are no restrictions on the size of the combined leakage
L = (L0,L) nor on the length of the vector L
′ in the definition. This in turn allows a source to easily
bypass the leakage bound by routing L0 through S1. To see this, note that the source S0 can simply split
L0 into several smaller packets and place them into the components of vector L
′. Various instantiations
of source S1 now simply recover these packets and leak them via their own leakage.
Note that in choosing the parameters for bounded parallel sources, one has to strike a delicate
balance between the complexity of obfuscating a hash function and the cost of encryption (resp. the
application in question). Indeed, suppose that a bounded parallel source assumption with parameters
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as above is used to prove an MLE scheme secure in the standard model. Now if the complexity of the
encryption scheme is high (e.g., because it is implemented based on iO [SW13] or because it includes
(artificial) redundant code), then the assumption can be broken by the iO attack, as described in the
previous section. Similarly, if one could reduce the complexity of obfuscating the hash function, an
attack would become feasible. However, considering the current state of research, obfuscation is a very
constly operation and thus, intuitively, computing the obfuscation of a hash function should be harder
than encrypting a message. Interestingly, it is the parallel complexity of obfuscating a hash function
(after a possibly complex preprocessing phase) that matters for the attack, and we can show that the
latter can lie in a complexity class which is dramatically below that of computing the obfuscation of the
hash function. More precisely, we show how to combine our iO attack with the randomized encodings
of Applebaum, Ishai, and Kushilevitz [AIK04] to split the attack into two stages such that the second
stage is highly parallelizable. Before describing our attack, let us briefly recall the notion of randomized
encodings.
4.1 Randomized encodings
Randomized encodings allow one to substantially reduce the complexity of computing a function f by
instead computing an encoding of it. This technique was first introduced by Ishai and Kushilevitz [IK00,
IK02] in the context of multi-party computation and has since found many applications [AIK04, AIK06,
IKOS08, GIS+10, AIKW13, App13]. The formalization of randomized encodings that we use here is due
to Applebaum, Ishai, and Kushilevitz (AIK) [AIK04] and is adapted to the setting of perfect correctness
and computational privacy. Informally, we say that fˆ(x; r) is a randomized encoding of some function
f(x) if (1) given fˆ(x; r) one can efficiently recover function value f(x), and (2) given f(x), one can
efficiently sample from the distribution fˆ(x; r) induced by uniformly choosing r.
More precisely, a randomized encoding scheme RE consists of three efficient algorithms (enc, dec, Sim)
as follows: (1) a probabilistic encoding algorithm enc which on input a security parameter 1λ, a circuit
computing fλ : {0, 1}
n(λ) → {0, 1}ℓ(λ) (of size polynomial in λ) and an x ∈ {0, 1}n(λ) outputs an encoding
z ∈ {0, 1}s(λ); (2) a deterministic decoder algorithm dec which on input the security parameter 1λ and an
encoding z ∈ {0, 1}s(λ) outputs an image point y ∈ {0, 1}ℓ(λ); and (3) a probabilistic simulation algorithm
Sim which on input 1λ and an image point y ∈ {0, 1}ℓ(λ) outputs an encoding z ∈ {0, 1}s(λ). To keep our
notation consistent with the previous literature on randomized encoding, for a given circuit fλ, we will
refer to the the mapping enc(1λ, fλ, ·; ·) by fˆλ : {0, 1}
n(λ)×{0, 1}m(λ) → {0, 1}s(λ), where {0, 1}m(λ) is the
randomness space of enc. We say scheme RE is a perfectly correct, computationally private randomized
encoding for a circuit class {Fλ}λ∈N if it satisfies the following two conditions.
• Correctness. For any fλ ∈ Fλ and any input x ∈ {0, 1}
n(λ) we have that
Pr
[
dec(1λ, fˆλ(x; renc)) = fλ(x) : renc←$ {0, 1}
m(λ)
]
= 1 .
• Privacy. For any PPT distinguisher D, any fλ ∈ Fλ, and any input x ∈ {0, 1}
n(λ) the following
distinguishing advantage is negligible:
AdvreRE,D,x(λ) := Pr[D(1
λ, fˆλ(x; renc)) = 1 : renc←$ {0, 1}
m(λ)]− Pr[D(1λ, Sim(1λ, fλ(x)) = 1] .
Functions n, ℓ, s, and m are polynomials, however, we will be dropping the explicit dependency on
λ in order to simplify notation, and set n := n(λ), ℓ := ℓ(λ), s := s(λ), and m := m(λ).
A randomized encoding can be trivially achieved by setting fˆ(x; r) := f(x). However one is usually
interested in an encoding, fˆ , which is in a low complexity class (typically NC0), although f itself might
be only computable in a higher class. AIK, utilizing garbled circuits, construct such encodings for
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several standard cryptographic primitives, such as one-way functions and pseudo-random generators,
in NC0. In our case, however, the complexity of the encoding is not crucial and, indeed, we only require
it to be computable in polynomial time. Rather, for our application, we are concerned with the input
locality of the computation of fˆ . More precisely, we want the number of input bits of x which affect
each output bit of the encoding fˆ(x; r) to be small. We will return to the topic of locality in Section 4.3.
4.2 Composing iO with randomized encodings
To ease readability, we present our attack in two stages. First, we show that our iO attack can be
composed with any randomized encoding scheme in a way which neither affects the adversary’s ad-
vantage nor the unpredictability of its implicit source. Then, in the next subsection, we use a special
type of RE scheme known as decomposable randomized encodings [IKOS08] to split and parallelize the
adversary’s source in order to meet the (minimal) bounds of q(λ) = 1, σ(λ) = 0, and τ(λ) ∈ O(λ).
Consequently, our attack will rule out bounded parallel sources for these parameters. Since the bounds
that our attacks achieves are very stringent, and an encryption scheme has to at least run in time O(λ)
(and make a single Hash query), assuming indistinguishability obfuscation, it is unlikely that bounded
parallel sources can be used to instantiate ROs in any meaningful application scenario.
Let H be a UCE[Scup ∩Sprlτ,σ,q]-secure hash function, iO be an indistinguishability obfuscator, and let
us assume once again that H.ol(λ) ≥ 2 · H.kl(λ). (As in the proof of Theorem 3.1, this assumption will
be without loss of generality.)
The attacker. Define Cλ,H,x,y(·) := (H.Ev(1
λ, ·, x) = y), and compute a randomized encoding of the
circuit
f : (x, y, rio) 7→ iO(Cλ,H,x,y(·); rio),
where rio is the randomness used by the obfuscator. As in the proof of Theorem 3.1, we consider the
source S which chooses random values x, rio, and renc, queries x to its oracle to obtain y ← Hash(x),
and leaks the randomized encoding
L := fˆ(x, y, rio; renc) .
The distinguisher D gets as input a hash key hk and an encoding fˆ(x, y, rio; renc). It uses the decoder
dec of the randomized encoding scheme to recover
if(x, y, rio)← dec(fˆ(x, y, rio; renc)) .
It then interprets the result as a circuit, runs it on on hk, and returns whatever the circuit outputs.
Advantage. The output of the decoder above, due to the definition of f and the perfect correctness
of the encoding scheme, is equal to iO(Cλ,H,x,y(·); rio). The same analysis as in Theorem 3.1 shows that
in case y was computed as H.Ev(1λ, hk, x), the obfuscated circuit, and hence D, always return 1. In case
that y was drawn at random, it is highly unlikely that it equals H.Ev(1λ, hk, x), and thus, D returns
0 with overwhelming probability. Hence D distinguishes the real hash function H (with a randomly
chosen key) from an ideal hash function with overwhelming probability. (See the proof of Theorem 3.1
on page 7 for further details.)
Unpredictability. Next we show that S is computationally unpredictable; that is, we show that x
is not leaked when Hash implements a random oracle. As in Theorem 3.1, we observe that the circuit
Cλ,H,x,y(·) is the zero circuit with overwhelming probability if y is chosen uniformly at random. (This is
because, as before, 2|hk| is assumed to be smaller than |y| and a counting argument applies.) Let P be
a predictor that succeeds with non-negligible probability in the PredPS (λ) game. We bound the success
probability of P based on the security of the indistinguishability obfuscator iO and the privacy of the
randomized encoding scheme via a sequence of 4 games as follows.
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Game0(λ): is identical to the computational unpredictability game Pred
P
S (λ) (see Figure 3).
Game1(λ): is similar to the previous game except that the source S now computes the leakage by first
computing the circuit iO(Cλ,H,x,y(·)) as an obfuscation of Cλ,H,x,y(·) and then running the RE
simulator Sim on it in, i.e., L←$ Sim(iO(Cλ,H,x,y(·))).
Game2(λ): is similar to the previous game except that the game terminates if there exists an hk ∈
{0, 1}H.kl(λ) such that Cλ,H,x,y(hk) = 1. We write (x, y) ∈ Bad(λ) if for values (x, y) such an hk
exists for which Cλ,H,x,y(hk) = 1.
Game3(λ): is similar to the previous game except that S now computes iO(Zλ(·)), where Zλ(·) denotes
the constant zero circuit, and then runs the RE simulator Sim on it in order to compute L.
We bound the difference between P ’s advantage in Game0(λ) and in Game1(λ) using the privacy
of the RE scheme. We let Gamei[x, y, rio](λ) denote Gamei(λ) where the source S chooses x as the
query point and rio as coins for the obfuscator, and the Hash oracle chooses y. Let D[x, y, rio](L) be a
distinguisher that on input L = fˆ(x, y, rio; renc) or L←$ Sim(iO(Cλ,H,x,y(·))) runs the predictor P on L
to get a point x′ and returns (x = x′). Note that when D[x, y, rio] gets a randomized encoding, it runs
the predictor in the Game0[x, y, rio](λ) environment, and when it gets a simulated encoding, it runs P
according to the rules of Game1[x, y, rio](λ). Hence,
Pr
[
GameP0 (λ)
]
− Pr
[
GameP1 (λ)
]
=Ex,y,rio
[
Pr
[
GameP0 [x, y, rio](λ)
]]
− Ex,y,rio
[
Pr
[
GameP1 [x, y, rio](λ)
]]
=Ex,y,rio
[
Pr
[
GameP0 [x, y, rio](λ)
]
− Pr
[
GameP1 [x, y, rio](λ)
]]
=Ex,y,rio
[
AdvreRE,D[x,y,rio],(x,y,rio)(λ)
]
≤ max
x,y,rio
AdvreRE,D[x,y,rio],(x,y,rio)(λ) .
Furthermore, by the computational privacy of scheme RE, we have that for any (x, y, rio) the advantage
AdvreRE,D[x,y,rio],(x,y,rio)(λ) is negligible, and hence so is the function maxx,y,rio Adv
re
RE,D[x,y,rio],(x,y,rio)
(λ).
By the fundamental lemma of the game-playing technique we have that
Pr
[
GameP0 (λ)
]
− Pr
[
GameP1 (λ)
]
≤ Prx,y [ (x, y) ∈ Bad(λ)] ≤
1
2H.ol(λ)/2
,
where the last inequality holds from the union bound and the fact that H.ol(λ) ≥ 2 · H.kl(λ) (see the
proof of Theorem 3.1).
We bound the change in P ’s advantage from Game2(λ) to Game3(λ) based on the security of the
obfuscator (this is essentially equivalent to the second game hop in the proof of Theorem 3.1). We
define Gamei[x, y](λ) similarly to the previous analysis to denote the game where S chooses x as the
query point and the oracle chooses y. We let D[x, y](C) be a distinguisher that gets as input a circuit
C, which is either an obfuscation of the zero circuit C0 := Zλ(·) or C1 := Cλ,H,x,y(·). Distinguisher
D[x, y](C) uses the simulator Sim of the RE scheme to obtain C ′←$ Sim(C), runs the predictor P on
C ′ to get x′, and returns (x = x′). Note that, according to the rules of the game (due to event Bad)
both C0 and C1 implement the same functionality (namely zero). If C = C1, then distinguisher D[x, y]
perfectly simulates Game2[x, y](λ) for P . In case D[x, y] gets as input C = C0, it perfectly simulates
Game3(λ) for P . Hence, using an analysis similar to that given above, we get
Pr
[
GameP2 (λ)
]
− Pr
[
GameP3 (λ)
]
≤ max
(x,y)/∈Bad(λ)
AdvioiO,D[x,y],C0,C1(λ) .
By the security of iO each term AdvioiO,D[x,y],C0,C1(λ) is negligible, and hence so is the above bound.
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Finally, in Game3(λ), the probability that P guesses x is upper bounded by Q(λ)/2
H.il(λ), where Q(λ)
denotes the number of oracle queries of S, which is negligible. This is because x is chosen uniformly at
random and the leakage that the predictor receives is independent of x. Putting the above equations
together, we get that
Pr
[
PredPS (λ)
]
≤ max
x,y,rio
AdvreRE,D[x,y,rio],(x,y,rio)(λ) + max(x,y)/∈Bad(λ)
AdvioiO,D[x,y],C0,C1(λ) +
1
2H.ol(λ)/2
+
Q(λ)
2H.il(λ)
.
Therefore P ’s advantage is negligible, and the source S is computationally unpredictable.
4.3 Splitting and parallelizing S using decomposable REs
Our analysis in the previous section holds for any randomized encoding scheme. We show that if a
decomposable scheme, is used to instantiate the attack, we recast the source above as a bounded parallel
source. Let us begin with the definition decomposable randomized encodings.
Decomposable encodings. In a decomposable randomized encoding (DRE) scheme, every output
bit of the encoding fˆ(x; r) depends on at most a single bit of x (but possibly on arbitrarily many bits
of r). More precisely, a decomposable randomized encoding scheme DRE consists of a four tuple of
algorithms (idx, enc, dec, Sim) as follows. Algorithm idx on input a circuit f and an index i ∈ [s] outputs
an index j ∈ [n] ∪ {0}. The decomposable encoding algorithm enc operates based on a local encoding
algorithm enc as follows. On input a circuit f , a point x, and random coins renc, for each i ∈ [s] compute
zi ← enc(f, i, x[idx(f, i)]; renc), where we define x[0] :=⊥, and return z ← (z1, . . . , zs). Algorithms dec
and Sim play the same roles as those in a conventional RE scheme. As before, we denote enc(f, i, b; renc)
by fˆi(b; renc). Thus we may write
fˆ(x; renc) = fˆ1(x[idx(1)]; renc)‖fˆ2(x[idx(2)]; renc)‖ · · · ‖fˆs(x[idx(s)]; renc) .
As Ishai et al. [IKOS08] point out, several constructions of randomized encodings are decomposable.
For example, AIK’s construction based on garbled circuits [AIK06] is a decomposable, perfectly correct,
and computationally private randomized encoding for any function in P/poly. Their construction relies
only on the existence of secure pseudorandom generators.
We show that we can compute decomposable randomized encodings in a very special way consisting
of two phases where the first phase is not given the entire input (this can easily be extended such that
the first phase does not depend on the input at all), and the second phase can be computed in parallel by
constant-depth circuits of low gate count. We will use this result to adapt our above attack to bounded
parallel sources by constructing a source S = Prl[S0, S1] that computes the very same encoding that
our previously described source did. Looking ahead, we note that the decomposability of the encoding
is convenient because every bit of the encoding depends on only a single bit of the actual input and
one can easily precompute both possibilities (that is, the encodings when the input bit is 0 and when
it is 1) as long as one knows the randomness for the encoding. Once the actual input is known all one
has to do to compute a proper encoding is to drop one of the two bits, an operation which can be easily
parallelized.2
Algorithm S0. Algorithm S0 of the source (see Figure 5) begins by generating the randomness for
the randomized encoder and the obfuscator (line 2). It then picks a random x in the domain of the
hash function and sets an auxiliary variable aux to x‖0H.ol(λ)‖rio (line 4). We will use this variable to
access the specific input bits that the randomized encoder needs. Note that we have not yet specified a
2The (decomposable) randomized encoding of [AIK06] is in NC0 assuming that pseudorandom generators exist in NC0.
Thus, using this randomized encoding scheme, the pre-computation part can also be parallelized.
14
Algo. S0(1
λ)
1 L′ ← [ ]
2 renc←$ {0, 1}
DRE.rl(λ); rio←$ {0, 1}
iO.rl(λ)
3 x←$ {0, 1}H.il(λ)
4 aux← x‖0H.ol(λ)‖rio
5 for i = 1 . . . s do
6 if H.il(λ) < idx(i) ≤ H.il(λ) + H.ol(λ) then
7 j ← idx(i)− H.il(λ)
8 b0 ← fˆi(0; renc)
9 b1 ← fˆi(1; renc)
10 L′[i]← 1‖b0‖b1‖j‖x
11 else
12 b← fˆi(aux[idx(i)]; renc)
13 L′[i]← 0‖b
14 return (ε,L′)
Algo. SHash1 (L
′[i])
1 c← MostSigBit(L′[i])
2 if c = 0 then
3 parse L′[i] as 0‖b
4 L← b
5 else
6 parse L′[i] as 1‖b0‖b1‖j‖x
7 y ← Hash(x)
8 if y[j] = 0 then
9 L← b0
10 else
11 L← b1
12 return L
Figure 5: Pseudocode of the parallel source S = Prl[S0, S1].
proper value for y at this point, but fixed it to the arbitrary string 0H.ol(λ). Next, algorithm S0 generates
a leakage value for every output bit of the encoding, i.e., for every i ∈ [s] (where s is the size of the
encoding). Here, we distinguish two cases. If the i-th output bit of the encoding depends on an input
bit corresponding to y, then the if branch in line 6 is executed. Otherwise, the else branch in line 11 is
run. In the first case, we first compute the index j of y that the encoding depends upon (line 7). As at
this point y has not yet been chosen, S0 computes the output bits for the two possible values of y[j];
that is, it stores the output bit for y[j] = 0 as b0 and the output bit for y[j] = 1 as b1. It then sets
the leakage at position i to 1‖b0‖b1‖j‖x (line 10). In the second case (i.e., when the output bit of the
encoding does not depend on a bit of y), algorithm S0 simply computes the output bit (it knows the
value of the corresponding input bit), stores it in b, and sets the leakage at position i to 0‖b (line 13).
At the end of the for loop L′ contains a single value for every output bit of the randomized encoding.
Algorithm S0 returns L
′.
Algorithm S1. An independent instance of algorithm S1 (see Figure 5) for every entry in L
′ is run.
On input L′[i] algorithm S1 checks if its input is of the form 0‖b. If so, it simply sets L← b and returns
L. Else, it parses L′[i] as 1‖b0‖b1‖j‖x and computes y ← Hash(x). (Note that S1 has access to Hash.)
It then sets L← b0 if y[j] = 0 and L← b1 otherwise. Finally, it outputs L.
By construction, the parallel source S := Prl[S0, S1] computes the same randomized encoding
fˆ(x, y, rio; renc) that our previous source did. Consequently, by setting the distinguisher D to be identi-
cal to that given in the previous attack, we obtain a successful bounded parallel attack. Furthermore,
(each instance of) algorithm S1 makes a single call to Hash and can be implemented by a constant-
depth circuit. Finally, and consistently with our observation that L0 can be routed via the second stage,
algorithm S0 always returns L0 = ε.
Dropping the length requirement. As in Theorem 3.1, in order to drop the requirement that
H.ol(λ) ≥ 2 · H.kl(λ) we may choose a t ≥ ⌈H.kl(λ)/H.ol(λ)⌉ and use the circuit
Cλ,H,(x1,y1),...,(xt,yt)(·) := (H.Ev(1
λ, ·, x1) = y1 ∧ · · · ∧ H.Ev(1
λ, ·, xt) = yt) .
When applying the decomposable randomized encoding scheme, each instance of S1 is responsible to
compute exactly one output bit of the encoding. As each output bit depends on at most a single input
bit, it can depend on at most one of the yk’s (for k = 1, . . . , t). We adapt algorithm S0 to prepare the
values L′[i]← 1‖b0‖b1‖jk‖xk and, thus, can leave algorithm S1 unchanged.
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Putting the above together, we obtain the following result.
Theorem 4.1 (Bounded parallel UCE infeasibility). If indistinguishability obfuscation (and PRGs)
exist, then UCE[Scup ∩ Sprlτ,σ,q] security cannot be achieved in the standard model for q 6= 0, any σ ≥ 0,
and τ ∈ Ω(λ).
Specifying the size of S1. We can specify the size of a circuit that computes S1, thereby giving a
precise lower bound on τ . For this we encode index j (the bit position of y the encoding depends on)
by a bitmap. That is, we encode it by a bit string yidx of length |yidx| = H.ol(λ) that contains a single 1
at the j-th position:
yidx := 0
j−1‖1‖0H.ol(λ)−j .
Furthermore, we let the output of S1 to be a bit string of length 1 + H.ol(λ) rather than a single bit.
This string will contain at most a single 1 and hence, in order to recover the correct output bit, the
distinguisher must simply compute the logical OR of all the bits in the string.
Consider the following input to S1
d‖b0‖b1‖yidx[1]‖ . . . ‖yidx[H.ol(λ)]‖x[1]‖ . . . ‖x[H.ol(λ)] ,
where we assume that in case it does not depend on y (see line 13), it is padded with zeros. The circuit
computes values (y[1], . . . , y[H.ol(λ)])← Hash(x), and outputs
¬d ∧ b0 ,
yidx[1] ∧
(
(¬y[1] ∧ b0) ∨ (y[1] ∧ b1)
)
,
...
yidx[H.ol(λ)] ∧
(
(¬y[H.ol(λ)] ∧ b0) ∨ (y[H.ol(λ)] ∧ b1)
)
.
The first bit computed above corresponds to line 4 of algorithm S1 (see Figure 5). The remaining
bits correspond to the computation of the else clause (line 5). Each of these bits corresponds to testing
whether the t-th bit of y needs to be considered (that is, if j = t; see line 7 of algorithm S0) and whether
to output b0 or b1 if this is the case. Note that, by construction, at most a single bit of the output
is set to 1, and to recover the output of our original algorithm S1 all that the distinguisher needs to
do is to compute the logical OR of the bits of the string. Furthermore, we note that delegating the
computation of the final OR to the distinguisher does not leak any information, since, given the result
of the OR operation, the distinguisher can reconstruct the bit string: If the resulting bit is 0, then the
bit string was the all-zero string. Else, the distinguisher only has to evaluate the index function idx of
the randomized encoding to reconstruct the position of the single 1 within the bit string.
By counting the operations above, we get that S1 can be implemented with a single oracle gate,
H.ol(λ) many OR gates, H.ol(λ)+1 many NOT gates, and 1+3 ·H.ol(λ) AND gates where all the AND
and OR gates have fan-in 2. Thus, our implementation of S1 is in NC
0.
5 Split Sources: A Discussion
In their original paper [BHK13a], BHK show that a UCE1-secure hash function is sufficiently strong
to produce simultaneous hardcore bits for any one-way function f and replace the random oracle in
the BR93 encryption scheme. As UCE1-secure hash functions are prone to our iO attack, in the
updated version of their paper [BHK13c], BHK introduce a new class of sources, called split sources,
to salvage these applications. A split source S is composed of two algorithms S0 and S1 as follows.
Neither algorithm gets access to the Hash oracle. Algorithm S0 outputs L0 together with a vector
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of points x. For each entry of x, the corresponding Hash value is computed, and the vector of hash
values y is formed. Algorithm S1 is then run on y, and L1 is produced. The leakage of the split source
S := Splt[S0, S1] is set to L := (L0, L1) (which is then passed to the distinguisher). The pseudocode for
split sources is give in Figure 4 on the right. We say that a source S is in class Ssplt if there exists PPT
algorithms S0 and S1 such that S = Splt[S0, S1]. It is then shown that if H ∈ UCE[S
cup ∩ Ssplt], that
is, if H is UCE-secure with respect to split, computationally unpredictable sources, then H is hardcore
for any one-way function f and can be also securely used in the BR93 encryption scheme.
Both values x and y in the construction of the circuit H.Ev(1λ, ·, x) = y are needed. However,
since there is no direct communication between the two components of a split source, and since each
component only sees one of these values, this circuit cannot be formed, and hence the iO attack cannot
be launched. The generalized attack from Section 4 also falls outside this source class since there is no
direct communication between the two source components.
In this section we discuss some intricacies of such sources. We show that when composing UCE[Scup∩
Ssplt] secure hash functions with one-way permutations, then the resulting function is not UCE[Scup ∩
Ssplt] secure. We go on to present necessary conditions for the security of such UCE[Scup ∩Ssplt] secure
functions. Although our observations are presented for split sources, due to their simplicity, they may
apply to other notions of computational unpredictability as well.
5.1 Composing UCEs with one-way permutations
Let H be a hash function and let π be a one-way permutation with appropriate domain and range.
Consider the function H′ defined by H′.Ev(1λ, hk, x) := H.Ev(1λ, hk, π(x)). That is, the input x is first
run through a one-way permutation before being hashed. Intuitively, this application of a one-way
permutation should not harm the security of H′. Indeed, this can be easily seen to be the case for the
one-wayness, collision resistance, and pseudorandomness properties. We show that statistical UCE1
also enjoys this property.
Proposition 5.1. Let H, π, and H′ be as defined above. Suppose that H ∈ UCE[Ssup]. Then we also
have that H′ ∈ UCE[Ssup].
Proof. Given an adversary (S′, D′) against the UCE[Ssup] security of H′, we construct an adversary
(S,D) against the UCE[Ssup] security of H as follows. Source S runs S′ and answers each oracle query
x by computing π(x), querying its own Hash oracle on π(x), and returning the answer to S′. When S′
outputs some leakage L, algorithm S also outputs L as its own leakage. The distinguisher D is defined
to be identical to D′. Note that (S,D) runs (S′, D′) in an environment identical to the UCE game for H′,
and (S,D) succeeds in guessing the correct bit with the same probability that (S′, D′) does. It remains
to show that S is statistically unpredictable. This follows by observing that any predictor P which
successfully guesses a query π(x) of S can be transformed into an algorithm P ′ which runs in unbounded
time and also returns x. This is a query of S, and this contradicts the statistical unpredictability
of S′.
Somewhat counterintuitively, we show that composition provably does not hold for split sources.
Proposition 5.2. Let H, π, and H′ be as defined above. Then H′ /∈ UCE[Scup ∩Ssplt] (irrespectively of
the security guarantees of H).
Proof. Consider the following (split) source S := Splt[S0, S1]. Algorithm S0 chooses a value x at
random, computes x′ ← π(x) and outputs (x′, x). Algorithm S1 receives as input y ← Hash(x) and
outputs y. The final leakage is, therefore, (x′, y). It is easy to see that the this source is computationally
unpredictable as neither x′ = π(x) nor y allow a computationally bounded predictor to recover x. Indeed,
in the unpredictability experiment (see Figure 3) y is drawn at random and independently of x and if
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a predictor could recover x from (π(x), y), one could turn it into an adversary against the one-wayness
of π.
Given the above source S, a distinguisher D can easily win the UCE game as follows. Algorithm
D computes y′ ← H.Ev(1λ, hk, x′) and outputs (y′ = y). Note that as H.Ev(1λ, hk, x′) = H′.Ev(1λ, hk, x)
the distinguisher will always output 1 in case Hash implements the real hash function H′. On the other
hand it will output 1 with only a negligible probability in case Hash implements a random oracle.
The simplicity of the technique allows this result to be applied more generally to other computational
notions of UCE security, as long as the structure of the hash function follows the one described above.
This, in particular, is the case for bounded parallel sources. Note also that we did not rely on any
obfuscation schemes.
5.2 One-way obfuscators vs. computational UCE security
The aforementioned attack only applies to hash functions that have a particular structure (i.e., those
which first apply a one-way permutation to their inputs). Although this assumption can be somewhat
relaxed—a one-way function, for example, would suffice—an attack on this special class of hash functions
does not allow for any general conclusions on split source UCE security. In the following, we will discuss
notions of obfuscation that might allow for a general break. Let H be a hash function. Consider
the following UCE adversary (S,D). Source S chooses a random x constructs the circuit C(·) :=
H.Ev(1λ, ·, x). It then calls Hash on x to receive y ← Hash(x) and outputs (O(C), y) as L, where O is a
special purpose obfuscator that we shall be describing shortly. Distinguisher D outputs (O(C)(hk) = y).
It is easily seen that adversary (S,D) wins the UCE game with overwhelming probability.
We need to ensure that S is a split source and computationally unpredictable. The split condition
can be easily seen to hold from the definition of algorithm S. The unpredictability property, however,
depends on the obfuscator O, and in particular on whether O(C) reveals x. In other words, the
(randomized) function
f : x 7→ O(H.Ev(1λ, ·, x))
needs to be one-way. We call such a primitive a one-way obfuscator. A direct consequence is that in
order to prove that a function H belongs to UCE[Scup ∩Ssplt], one needs to show that it is not one-way
obfuscatable.
It is possible to construct hash functions that are provably not one-way obfuscatable in the above
sense. Let H be a hash function, and define a modified function H′ which on key hk = 0H.kl(λ) outputs
x. That is, H′.Ev(1λ, hk, x) := H.Ev(1λ, hk, x) if hk 6= 0H.kl(λ) and H′.Ev(1λ, hk, x) := x otherwise. As the
security of UCE notions is defined over a random choice of key this modification does not harm UCE
security. Now, given an obfuscation of the circuit C(·) := H′.Ev(1λ, ·, x) it is easy to recover x via a
query on the weak key hk = 0H.kl(λ).
As this notion of one-way obfuscation is not achievable, let us relax the notion further and transform
the attack into one that only relies on a weaker notion of one-way obfuscation. Consider the circuit
C(·, ·) := (H.Ev(1λ, ·, x) = ·); that is, the circuit which takes two inputs hk and y and outputs 1 if
H.Ev(1λ, hk, x) = y, and 0 otherwise. Now, consider an S which leaks a one-way obfuscation of the
circuit C(·, ·) together with the value y = Hash(x). A distinguisher D on input hk, the obfuscated
circuit, and y, can win the UCE game by computing C(hk, y) and directly outputting the result. Hence,
in order to prove that a function H is in UCE[Scup ∩ Ssplt], one now needs to show that
f : x 7→ O(H.Ev(1λ, ·, x) = ·)
is not one way. Indeed, the previous counterexample using a single “weak key” against one-way obfus-
cation no longer works as one would need to guess x in order to be able to extract x. However, hash
functions can still be tweaked to avoid this attack. Towards demonstrating this, we will introduce a
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larger set of weak hash keys. Let H be a hash function as above, and define a modified function H′
which works similarly to H except that if a key is of the form 0i‖1‖0j for i, j ≥ 0 and i+ j = H.kl(λ)− 1
it returns x[i+1]‖0H.ol(λ)−1. It is easily established that using O(H′.Ev(1λ, ·, x) = ·), the point x can be
extracted with H.il(λ) many queries as the weak keys allow one to learn x bit by bit.
It is conceivable that weaker forms of obfuscation, e.g., an approximate version where the obfuscated
circuit may err on a portion of input pairs (hk, y), might well be within the reach and powerful enough
to mount an attack on UCEs even in the presence of weak keys. Furthermore, artificially introducing
weaknesses (such as the above weak keys) into existing functions is not sufficient unless the function is
changed on a large fraction of keys (resp. inputs). For this note that in such a case source S can simply
obfuscate the initial circuit (i.e., the circuit that was adapted to introduce weak keys). In any case, the
existence of such weaknesses in the hash function to achieve UCE security seem to be a counterintuitive
design principle.
Finally, BHK suggest using the SHA family [Nat12] in the HMAC mode [BCK96] as a practical
instantiations of UCEs [BHK13a]. It is not known whether any of the SHA functions have weak keys,
and indeed, the discovery of such keys would constitute a major breakthrough in the cryptanalysis of
SHA. Thus, in order to gain further confidence in the applicability of this construction its extractability
properties, for example, in conjunction with the candidate obfuscator of Garg et al. [GGH+13], needs
to be better understood.
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